SCHATTSCHEIDER, E. E.

Elmer Eric Schattschneider (1892–1971) was born in Bethany, Minnesota, August 11, 1892, and spent his early years in Wisconsin. If his political consciousness was nurtured in that seat of Progressivism, his adult life was spent opposing many of its central tenets. Progressives and Schattschneider shared a distaste of machine politics and corruption, and both approached democratic politics as a moral crusade. From there they parted company. Schattschneider spent his professional life in the analysis and advocacy of political parties, precisely the institutions so successfully attacked by such Progressive legislation as nonpartisan elections, city manager government, at-large districts, and the direct primary. In the minds of United States legislators and citizens alike, the Progressives carried the day. Most political scientists disagree. The antiparty spirit that animated Progressive legislation is responsible, many believe, for the decline of American political parties in the twentieth century.

Schattschneider believed that the mass of citizens could participate effectively in government only through party competition. This theme is developed in each of Schattschneider’s books spanning 34 years: Politics, Pressures and the Tariff (1935), Party Government (1942), The Semisovereign People (1960), and Two Hundred Million Americans in Search of a Government (1969). His political theories are of an intellectual piece. That consistency of outlook put him in and out of phase with the central concerns of political scientists during the four decades of his professional life.

One reason for the cohesiveness and consistency of his views is perhaps that Schattschneider was a mature man when he published his first book. Between his University of Wisconsin B.A. in 1915 and his Columbia University Ph.D. twenty years later, Schattschneider spent a year in the navy, two years working with the Young Men’s Christian Association, and eight years as a high school teacher. He was 43 when he completed Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. Since the principal arguments of his political theory had evolved by the time his first book was published, his work can be discussed conceptually rather than chronologically.

Nature of man. Schattschneider was not a Hobbesian, not even a Madisonian. He thought people were, in their fundamental aspects, benign. If Madison believed that all men, given the opportunity, would tyrannize over other men (Dahl 1956), Schattschneider could reply without embarrassment that “democracy is about the love of people” (1969, p. 43). According to Schattschneider, “democracy is both a moral system and a form of government.” That moral ideal was equality: “Democracy begins as an act of imagination about people. . . . Democracy does not turn its back on anybody. It takes a lot of indiscriminate affection for people as people to run a democracy” (p. 46). A realist, Schattschneider knew that many people are hard to love. The second law of politics? “It is impos-
sible to get all of the S.O.B.'s into one party" (p. 53).

*Two Hundred Million Americans* contains an ingenious demonstration of the progress toward an egalitarian political culture in the United States. Working on the assumption that language reflects a value system, Schattschneider used nineteenth-century dictionaries to show the degree to which our language has been democ-
ratized. In those early dictionaries common people were often characterized with the pejoratives vulgar, ordinary, mean, low. Now, "the vocabulary of indignities has been cleaned up to make the language fit for use in a democratic society" (p. 51).

As an egalitarian, Schattschneider was an unapologetic majoritarian, and he labeled Madison's *Federalist No. 10* a philosophical curiosity, embodying serious inconsistency. Madison believed that social pluralism—a large, diverse republic—would render it unlikely for any popular majority to unite to deny political liberties to a minority. Why, then, Schattschneider wondered, did Madison defend the necessity of a constitutional separation of powers as well? (1942, p. 18). Madison could have replied that divided constitutional authority was intended less to solve the problem of a tyrannical majority among the citizenry than it was to solve another problem, the abuse of constitutional authority by government officials themselves. Still, Schattschneider's pique at Madison's defense of separation of powers is understandable. Madison had helped establish a division of constitutional authority that was incompatible with Schattschneider's ideal of party government.

If Schattschneider's assumptions about the nature of political man begin with an act of democratic imagination, he does not imagine that political man is an informed civic activist. His views on the political knowledge of citizens are quite consistent with those of such political economists as Downs (1957) and Schumpeter (1942). Extensive knowledge is a scarce resource, expensive for the expert to obtain and not to be expected of citizens. Nor is it necessary either: "Economists, trying to explain the operation of the economy, use a political expression when they speak of the 'sovereignty of the consumer,' precisely because they realize that it is not necessary to know how to make a television set in order to buy one intelligently. Democracy is like nearly everything else we do; it is a form of collaboration of ignorant people and experts" (1960, p. 137).

Socialization of conflict. In Schattschneider's world, conflict is endemic in political life. All politics revolves around the exploitation of energy that is based on conflict. People turn to government when they want to ensure that the balance of power among competing private interests does not prevail. When the loser in a battle among private interests seeks reinforcements among the previously uninvolved, the competition for popular support enhances people's knowledge of what they have at stake in the contest: "To a great extent, the whole discussion of the role of government in modern society is at root a question of the scale of conflict. Democratic government is the greatest single instrument for the socialization of conflict in the American community" (ibid., p. 13).

When Schattschneider wrote these words, most political theorists viewed conflict as a danger to civil liberties and to democratic government. Against the historical backdrop of the world-wide authoritarian mass movements of the 1930s and 1940s, McCarthyism in the 1950s, and a growing research literature that seemed to discover public ignorance of the substance and procedure of democratic government, pluralist theories emphasized the importance of protecting consensus and limiting conflict.

The importance attached to nonvoting is an example of the intellectual distance between Schattschneider and many pluralists of the time. Some pluralists followed Berelson's position (1952) that apathy could reflect people's satisfaction with the political system, and that sudden increases in turnout were often associated with an antilibertarian movement destructive of a tolerant political system. Schattschneider's concern was starkly different. He worried that "nonvoting is a characteristic of the poorest, least well-established, least educated stratum of the community," and he lamented the failure of the parties to compete on issues that would reveal to this nonvoting population what interests it had in political conflicts (1960, p. 105).

As a "conflict theory" published during the vogue of pluralist consensus theories, *The Semi-sovereign People* was not well received at the time of its publication. As conflict theories have gained in respectability, so has the impact of Schattschneider's work on contemporary theory. But it must be remembered that, for Schattschneider, democratic conflict requires a moral consensus. Without its "moral basis" Schattschneider emphasized, without a belief in equality and tolerance, "democracy as a form of gov-
ernment may be a dangerous instrument for generating destructive conflict" (1969, p. 45).

Private versus public interests. The distinction between public and private interests is one of the most important of Schattschneider’s concepts. It is also one of his most problematic. He defines the public interest as those "general or common interests shared by all or by substantially all members of the community" (1960, p. 23). If, however, he means by common interests beliefs and goals actually shared in common, then the concept is inconsistent with the rest of the theory, which is based on competition and conflict of values.

Schattschneider’s distinction between public and private interests must be understood in terms of some broader theory. For Schattschneider that theory would be liberal majoritarianism. A sensible interpretation of his argument is that the public interest is what an ideal democracy produces. When conflict is high, when parties compete for votes in terms of alternative programs, when a high proportion of the electorate becomes sufficiently aroused by the contest to consider the arguments and to vote its preferences, we are then willing to assume that people reasonably know their interests—at least as much as these interests can be known in a world in which information about the present is limited and the future cannot be predicted. In short, party government produces the public interest.

We can now begin to understand the basis of Schattschneider’s faith in human nature. A democratic society encourages the sustenance of democratic citizens—people who know and act on their interests but who also come to appreciate that people of opposing interests should be treated with respect and tolerance.

Party politics versus pressure politics. Schattschneider (1948a) saw parties and pressure groups as antithetical. Parties exist to control government, and formulating policies and nominating candidates are means to that end. But groups are interested only in particular policies. Supporting candidates, lobbying legislators and bureaucrats, financing litigation—these are, in Schattschneider’s view, simply means for groups to obtain policy goals.

Pressure groups also differ from parties in the proportion of the public each includes. As electoral organizations, parties engage mass followings. In contrast, "the law of the imperfect political mobilization of interests" (1942, p. 50) underlines the fact that the vast majority of people are not members of any interest group. Hence Schattschneider’s famous statement: "The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper class accent" (1960, p. 35).

Schattschneider’s belief that the bias of the pressure system is probusiness and upper class was undoubtedly influenced by his choice of his first research project. An analysis of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Politics, Pressures and the Tariff is a notable demonstration of the activity of producer groups, and the passivity of consumer groups (1935, p. 285). Smoot–Hawley reflected an age of protectionism in which tariff rates for thousands of products were written by Congress directly into legislation. In 1934 the Roosevelt administration enacted the Reciprocal Trade Act, which authorized the president to negotiate mutual tariff reductions with other countries. By the 1950s, the ideology of protectionism had waned. The responsibility for tariff rates had passed to the executive branch, and as Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963) report in their landmark study of the Reciprocal Trade Extensions of 1954, 1955, and 1962, pressure groups ceased to dominate tariff rates. Nevertheless, they gave high praise to the enduring importance of Schattschneider’s Politics, Pressures and the Tariff: "Schattschneider’s book set the tone for a whole generation of political writing on pressure groups. The present volume is in some ways a dissent from Schattschneider’s position. We find that what happened in 1929 is not a general model of the legislative process. We do not deny the facts of the case as Schattschneider presents them. He has reported an episode in the legislative drama during which selfish interests treated the halls of Congress as their own" (p. 25).

Party government. Schattschneider concluded his study of the tariff by stating: "To manage pressures is to govern; to let pressures run wild is to abdicate" (1935, p. 293). If it is the responsibility of government to control pressures, he believed, then only responsible parties are sufficient to the task. The doctrine of responsible parties long predates (Ranney 1954) Schattschneider’s defense in Party Government. Many observers had previously argued that a political culture of individualism and a constitutional separation of powers made a hostile environment for cohesive parties. If responsible parties seem an impossible achievement, Party Government has remained important nonetheless. Many scholars have elaborated on its ideas of
the consequences of electoral systems for parties. To Schattschneider, the electoral system is a major cause of the two-party system (1942; cf., Duverger 1950). It exaggerates the representation of the winning party (cf., the “cube law,” March 1957–1958) and produces moderate parties that move toward the “political center of gravity” (p. 86; cf., the convergence theorem in Downs 1957). What maintains competition between the parties? “It would be unprofitable to accumulate an excessive majority... a landslide is a political extravagance” (p. 95; cf., the theory of a minimum winning coalition in Riker 1962).

In 1946 the American Political Science Association created the Committee on Political Parties, with Schattschneider as its chairman. Its report, Toward a More Responsible Two-party System (1950), was widely praised and fiercely criticized. On the significant point of internal party democracy, the report departs strikingly from Schattschneider's own views. In contrast to the report's defense of internal party democracy, Schattschneider believed that “democracy is not to be found in the parties but between the parties” (1942, p. 60). A party is not a mass association of voters; it is “a political enterprise conducted by a group of working politicians supported by partisan voters” (ibid., p. 59). Ranney (1975, p. 144) argued that one's definition of a party member determines one's position on nearly all issues of party reform and internal party democracy. So it was with Schattschneider. He consistently opposed the direct primary, which the Report defended, because he believed primaries to be destructive of party organizations and irrelevant to the broader question of democracy.

Democracy. What then is democracy? It is “a competitive political system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process” (1960, p. 141). Government officials take the initiative for policy proposals and accept responsibility for the conduct of public business. The opposition party stands as a critic of the government and as an alternative government. Between the two the public makes its sovereign judgment, “a sovereign whose vocabulary is limited to two words, ‘Yes’ and ‘No’” (1942, p. 52). It is a theory of democracy that places consent rather than participation at its core. Americans, who value participation almost as much as they mistrust political parties, have remained hostile to democracy defined as party government. Schattschneider's works failed then as public advocacy. Since he wrote The Semisovereign People, changes in party rules and election laws have increased internal party democracy at the same time that party government has withered even further. Progressivism has thus far had the last word.

Civic and professional life. One aspect of Progressivism that Schattschneider never rejected was a commitment to public advocacy and civic participation. He was elected to his city council and served on a number of town and state commissions. He won a Freedom Foundation award for a television broadcast with Julian Hart of Yale University on democracy as a moral system, the topic that became a major portion of Two Hundred Million Americans. He was also active in the American Political Science Association, serving as president in 1956/1957. Schattschneider taught at Columbia University from 1927–1930 while working on his doctorate, at the New Jersey College for Women in 1929/1930, and at Wesleyan University from 1930 until his retirement in 1960. He continued to teach and publish through his retirement years until his death at 78 in Old Saybrook, Connecticut, March 4, 1971.

Richard W. Boyd

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Supplementary bibliography
SCHIEFFÉ, HENRY

The life and career of Henry Scheffé (1907–1977) cover the period when the study and development of statistical methods emerged as the recognized discipline of statistics or mathematical statistics (Owen 1976). He was one of the first and finest pioneers of the new species, “mathematical statistician.” Until World War II, the subject was developed in the United States and abroad by those whose research required it. Thus, even if they were mathematically trained, the developers of the discipline usually had some other profession (e.g., biology, economics, etc.) than statistics.

Scheffé was born to German parents on April 11, 1907, in New York City. He initially studied engineering at the Cooper Union Free Night School, the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute, and Bell Telephone Laboratories, where he also worked for a short time. In 1928, he entered the University of Wisconsin, taking a B.A. in mathematics in 1931. He remained there as a doctoral student of R. E. Langer, receiving his degree in 1935 for work on differential equations.

The great developments in statistics, by Karl and E. S. Pearson and R. A. Fisher in the United Kingdom and Jerzy Neyman in Poland, the United Kingdom, and then at Berkeley, had been picked up by Harold Hotelling at Columbia University and S. S. Wilks at Princeton University. In addition, Abraham Wald arrived at Columbia in 1938. When Scheffé decided in the late 1930s to leave mathematical analysis for statistics, he naturally went first to Princeton and Columbia, and inevitably Berkeley, which became the world center of mathematical statistics. He was at Princeton (1941–1944), Columbia (1946–1963), and the University of California at Berkeley from 1953 until his retirement in 1974. In 1954 he was president of the Institute of the Mathematical Statistics and from 1954 to 1956, vice president of the American Statistical Association. He died of injuries sustained in a bicycle accident in Berkeley on July 5, 1977.

By the early 1940s, Wilks’s enthusiasm and the pioneering possibilities of the new subject had gathered many young people to Princeton. The outbreak of World War II and the need to apply mathematics and statistics to urgent national problems brought a further concentration of statisticians to Columbia and Princeton. Scheffé, like many others who subsequently had distinguished careers in statistics, worked during this period for the Office of Scientific Research and Development in the New York area. His mathematical talents were the more useful for his engineering background and growing knowledge of statistics.

In the 12-year period, from 1941 to 1953, Scheffé was almost literally in close contact with everyone and with every idea that has subsequently affected the course of statistics in the United States. These influences were diverse and conflicting—statistics as a guide to the elucidation of immediate practical problems; statistics as something to be studied in an orderly and elegant mathematical manner; the decision-theoretic formulation versus the more inferential mode; the polar interests of Wilks in nonparametric methods and multivariate (normal) analysis. One area of statistics that seems to have been underrepresented in this group and perhaps overrepresented elsewhere was the design and analysis of comparative experiments.

Scheffé was quiet and modest and very much