

Popular Control of Public Policy: A Normal Vote Analysis of the 1968 Election*

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This paper presents two arguments. One argument is that the 1968 election bears witness to the importance of issues at critical points in political history. American surveys show that issues vary greatly over time in their total impact on elections. From 1936 to 1948 the question of the role of the federal government had a major effect on the flow of voters between the parties.¹ In contrast, studies conducted during the rather apolitical period of the 1950s demonstrated both a lack of ideological structure in people's beliefs and a marginal impact of issues in influencing their votes.² With the Goldwater and Wallace insurgencies of 1964 and 1968, issues became again important components of electoral decisions.³ This was particularly true

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¹ V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), Chap. 3.

² Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), Chaps. 8-10. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter, (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-61. Philip E. Converse, "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue," in Edward R. Tufte, ed., *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1970), pp. 168-89. Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review*, 54 (June, 1960), 406-27.

³ For analyses of issues in the 1964 election, see Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (March, 1966), 19-28; John H. Kessel, *The Goldwater Coalition* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), Chap. 9; Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (June, 1965), 321-36; Walter Dean Burnham, "American Voting Behavior and the 1964 Election,"

of Vietnam, urban unrest and race, social welfare, and Johnson's performance as president—the dominant issues of 1968.

A second argument is that issues having a similar impact on the election outcome can have very different consequences for popular control of public policy. On some issues the electorate exercises no effective constraints on leaders' policy choices. On others, the electorate permits political leaders a wide array of options when a policy is adopted but passes a retrospective judgment on the policy in subsequent elections. On still other issues, the public severely limits the options of leaders at the time policy is made. Race and public order, it is argued, are examples of issues on which the electorate places the most significant restraints on the policy initiatives of political leaders.

A Normal Vote Analysis of Issues in 1968

Converse's normal vote technique is a particularly useful means of relating issues to the vote.⁴ Essentially, the method provides an esti-

Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (Feb., 1968), 1-40; and David E. RePass, "Issue Salience and Party Choice," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 389-400. For 1968 see Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Jerrold G. Rusk, and Arthur C. Wolfe, "Continuity and Change in American Politics: Parties and Issues in the 1968 Election," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (Dec., 1969), 1083-105; Herbert F. Weisburg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," *American Political Science Review* 64 (Dec., 1970), 1167-85; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Wallace Whitelash," *Transaction*, 7 (Dec., 1969), 23-35; Samuel A. Kirkpatrick and Melvin E. Jones, "Vote Direction and Issue Cleavage in 1968," *Social Science Quarterly*, 51 (Dec., 1970), 689-705; and Gerald M. Pomper, "Controls and Influence in American Elections (Even 1968)," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 13 (Nov./Dec., 1969), 215-30.

⁴ Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 9-39. Aside from this seminal article, which utilizes the normal vote to estimate the importance of the religious issue in 1960, the normal vote technique has seen limited application. Two exceptions are J. Merrill Shanks, "The Impact of Voters' Political Information on Electoral Change: A Reexamination of the Quality of American Electoral Decisions," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970), which presents an extension of Converse's work; and John H. Kessel, *Goldwater Coalition*, p. 294-97. Two other

mate of a party's *expected* proportion of the vote for any selected subgroup of the electorate in a normal election. This estimate is based on three factors: the balance of party identifiers within the group, the typical defection rates of identifiers to other parties, and the turnout rate. In the American context, a normal vote is defined as one in which the defection rates of Republicans and Democrats to the opposing parties are equal, with an adjustment made in the prediction in recognition of the greater tendency of Republicans to vote and to vote loyally for their party's candidate.⁵

Applying the concept of a normal vote to a political issue requires a calculation of normal (expected) votes for each group of persons holding different positions on the issue. Computing these expected votes is quite straightforward.⁶

(1) Responses to the issue are cross-classified against the Survey Research Center measure of party identification.

(2) The scores (+2, +1, 0, -1, -2) are assigned to the five classes of identifiers (Strong Democrat, Weak Democrat, Independent, Weak Republican, Strong Republican).

(3) From the scores, a mean party identification score is calculated for the distribution of party identifiers within each response category of the issue item.

(4) The obtained mean (M) is then inserted into the prediction equation,

$$V = .483 + .268M,$$

where V is the expected Democratic proportion of the vote. This linear equation is an approximation of a more complex equation. Converse

articles have used the intuitive notion of the normal vote, though the authors estimated the normal vote with aggregate data. See Harvey M. Kabaker, "Estimating the Normal Vote in Congressional Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 23 (Feb., 1969), 58-83; and Barbara Hinckley, "Incumbency and the Presidential Vote in Senate Elections: Defining the Parameters of Subpresidential Voting," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (Sept., 1970), 836-42.

⁵ Though Republicans vote at higher rates than Democrats, the effect of the *total* turnout rate on the two-party vote division is slight. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," pp. 28-30. Kabaker, "Estimating the Normal Vote . . .," pp. 78 and 83. Therefore, the assumption that Converse must make regarding the level of turnout underlying the normal party division is not critical.

⁶ Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," pp. 34-39. A normal vote analysis for a particular issue requires only simple arithmetic and two cross-classification tables (one to compute the expected party vote and another to determine the actual party vote). Therefore, the technique is particularly suitable for undergraduate research exercises.

states the linear equation estimates the predictions of the more complex equation within +1 to -1 per cent for means within the range of +.8 to -.8. This confidence interval includes the range of expected Democratic vote percentages from 27.1 to 69.5.


The intuitive meaning of the normal vote equation is easily grasped. The constant (48.3 per cent) is the expected Democratic vote for a group of identifiers that is perfectly balanced among Republicans and Democrats. (Thus, the mean [M] would be zero, and the predicted Democratic vote [V] would equal the constant.) The fact that the Republicans would win a majority from a group equally divided between Republicans and Democrats reflects the disadvantage the Democratic party suffers as a result of the greater relative loyalty and turnout of Republican partisans. A predominantly Democratic population yields a positive mean which adds to the constant, just as a Republican population yields a negative mean which diminishes it.

As the equation makes clear, the only factor that enters directly into the calculation of an expected vote for a group of people is the distribution of party identifiers within it. This equation, while cheap in data costs, does presume that the expected Democratic vote is the same for all subgroups of the electorate having the same distribution of party identifiers. This assumption is not as questionable as it might first appear. Shanks has begun an extension of Converse's procedures, adding to the prediction equation a more theoretically pleasing set of variables. Since Shanks's estimates of the expected Democratic vote for several subgroups are almost identical to those of Converse for the presidential elections of 1952-1964, I have used Converse's more parsimonious equation.⁷

The utility of the normal vote calculation is that it permits the analyst to separate issues into their *partisan* (long-term) components and their *short-term* components. Consider Figure 1 as an example of a normal vote analysis of an

⁷ Shanks, "Impact of Voters' Political Information . . .," p. 149. Converse and Shanks define a normal vote differently. Converse defines a normal vote empirically, by averaging the results of several elections and by assuming that short-term forces are averaged out in the process. Shanks treats a normal election as a pure, hypothetical concept and obtains estimates of the propensity of individuals to vote for a party by a technique of simulation. Shanks's results are strongly affected by the constraints he places upon the simulation (a fact he is well aware of). An important consideration in my use of Converse's equations is that one of Shanks's constraints is that the simulation must produce results comparable to those of Converse.

Figure 1. The Normal Vote and Speed of Movement on Civil Rights



Item: "Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you: Do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or are they moving about the right speed?"

* In the parentheses, the first figure is the frequency base for the computation of the expected Democratic vote. It includes all party identifiers and independents. The second figure is the frequency base for the computation of the actual vote percentages. It includes all respondents who cast votes for one of the three major candidates.

† The expected Republican vote is 100 minus the expected Democratic vote.

important issue in 1968—the speed with which civil rights leaders have been pushing their cause.

The Partisan Component of a Civil Rights Issue.

The partisan component is the degree of party polarization on an issue.⁸ Party polarization in turn is a function of two factors:

(1) One aspect of polarization is the degree of association of issue positions with party identification. Party identification is both stable over the lifetime of most voters and a major determinant of their electoral choices.⁹ There-

⁸ The careful reader will note that I am defining the concept of a partisan component differently than Converse does. In my usage the partisan component of an issue is simply its relation to party identification. Converse defines "partisan forces" as short-term stimuli, which are pro-Democratic or pro-Republican in varying degrees of strength and which induce defections from the normal party vote. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote," p. 15.

⁹ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, Chaps. 6-7.

fore, an issue on which mass party members are polarized sinks its roots into a stable, long-term division in the electorate. Knowing the balance of party loyalties of people holding some view on a particular issue, one can predict how these persons would vote in a normal election. These predictions are called *expected Democratic votes*.

The partisan component of an issue is manifest in changes in the expected Democratic proportion of the vote across issue positions—the greater the changes, the more partisan are people's attitudes on the issue. In Figure 1 the balance of party identification among persons believing that civil rights people have been pushing too slowly so favors the Democrats that the Democrats would expect to receive 68 per cent of the votes in a normal election. In contrast, among those who believe civil rights people are pushing too fast, the Democrats would normally expect to receive 54 per cent of the vote. This difference of 14 percentage points (68 minus 54) reflects the relative degree of polarization of the mass parties on the issue.

(2) A second aspect of polarization is the proportion of people advocating each of the issue positions. Polarization is born of conflict of opinions; as consensus is approached, an issue ceases to divide the parties. In Figure 1, nine times as many people think civil rights people are pushing too fast as think they are pushing too slowly. In Stokes's terms this is almost a valence issue, an issue on which there is no disagreement;¹⁰ as such, it cannot be a partisan issue.

The Short-Term Component of a Civil Rights Issue.

The short-term component of an issue is its relationship to defections from the normal party vote. In Figure 1 the short-term component is distinct. Humphrey received more than his full complement of expected votes from those who thought civil rights people were pushing too slowly. But those who believed civil rights leaders were pushing too fast gave Humphrey only 33 per cent of their votes, 21 percentage points below what Humphrey normally could have expected. The greatest proportion of the losses in this latter group went to Wallace. The expected Republican vote for this group is 100 minus the expected Democratic vote of 54 per cent, or 46 per cent. Nixon actually received 51 per cent of their votes, which was 5 points better than he could normally expect. The remainder

¹⁰ Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," in Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order*, p. 170. The opposite of a valence issue is a position issue.

(21 minus 5) of Humphrey's 21 point loss is the 16 per cent Wallace vote in that category. Again, we note the distribution of opinion on the issue. The rate of defections of Democrats from Humphrey was greatest among those who believed civil rights leaders were pushing too fast, a group which easily held the majority position on this issue.

What can we conclude from the observation of the deviations from the normal Democratic vote? Certainly not that the issue was causally related to the vote or that the issue made some net contribution to the observed Democratic vote. The reason is that from survey data it is difficult to determine with precision the issues (if any) that lead each person to cast his vote for a particular party. Lacking a method of categorizing the electorate, normal vote analysis cannot ascertain the net gain or loss of an issue to a candidate.

What we can say is this: For respondents in this sample the distribution of party identification is such that the Democrats would expect to receive 57 per cent of a normal vote.¹¹ In fact Humphrey received 41 per cent, 16 percentage points below a normal Democratic vote. If

¹¹ On the basis of the five presidential and congressional elections from 1952 to 1960, Converse estimates the normal vote for the whole population to be 54 per cent Democratic. By 1968 the balance of party identification has become slightly more Democratic. Applying Converse's equation, $V = .483 + .268M$, to the 1968 sample gives an expected Democratic vote in 1968 of 57 per cent Democratic. Having recomputed the normal vote for the 1968 sample, I do not have to assume that the distribution of party identification was unchanged from the 1952-1960 period, i.e., that partisan realignment was not taking place in 1968. I am assuming that the probability of an individual party identifier voting for the candidate of his own party remained basically unchanged from the earlier period.

The use of normal vote analysis does present two problems of interpretation. The first problem is that short-term political factors slightly influence responses to the party identification measure. (See footnote 28, Kessel, *Goldwater Coalition*, pp. 295-96.) As a result some short-term political influences will be submerged in the expected party vote. The effect of this result is to make the short-term relationships of issues to votes slightly conservative underestimates of the true relationships. A second, more difficult problem is the Wallace candidacy in 1968. The estimates of the normal vote assume only two major candidates, not three. With Wallace in the race, the normal vote analyses can be interpreted as follows: The normal vote projects the expected vote in 1968 if short-term forces had been in balance and if only two major candidates had run. The Wallace candidacy is then interpretable as a short-term force responsible for deviations from the expected Democratic and Republican votes. In justification of this interpretation, there is scant evidence that many voters identified themselves as members of the American Independent Party of Wallace. On the 1968 party identification measure, only 0.2 per cent of the sample falls into the category reserved for people who think of themselves as members of a minor party.

Humphrey had lost this same 16 percentage points across every issue position, then this issue would not even be statistically related to short-term defections from the normal vote. Such is not the case with the civil rights issue in the previous example. Humphrey exceeded his expected vote among some civil rights groups and fell short in others. The variation of the actual gains and losses in each issue category (+2, -10, and -21) from the overall deficit (16 points) is a measure of the issue's strength of association with short-term defections from the normal vote. Thus, even if we cannot speak in causal terms of an issue's contribution to the vote, we can compare issues statistically in terms of their association with long-term party loyalties and short-term defections from the normal party vote. Appendix II provides the formulas for such comparisons.

With this explanation of normal vote analysis, we can now decompose a set of 15 issues in the 1968 SRC election study and compare them in terms of their long- and short-term components. This set of issues falls into four broad groupings: Vietnam, social welfare, urban unrest and race, and civil liberties and public protest. A final issue orientation, the electorate's evaluation of Johnson's performance as president, does not fit neatly into any of these categories; it will be considered separately.

Vietnam: The Vulnerability of the Status Quo Position. The 1968 election study includes two very useful items probing attitudes toward the Vietnam war: escalation vs. de-escalation, and immediate withdrawal vs. military victory. Both reveal similar patterns, illustrated by Figure 2, a presentation of preferences for escalation vs. de-escalation.


As one would predict on a matter of foreign policy, there are no long-term, partisan aspects of people's attitudes about Vietnam.¹² Republicans and Democrats are almost equally likely to endorse solutions ranging from pulling out of Vietnam entirely to taking a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam. This is reflected in the similarity of the expected Democratic votes in the three categories of policy alternatives.¹³

In contrast, the short-term component of at-

¹² Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, Chap. 8; V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1964), Chap. 7.

¹³ The average of the deviations of the expected Democratic vote in the response categories from the grand expected Democratic vote is only 1.18 per cent. This small average deviation puts this item in last place among the 15 items when ranked according to the magnitude of their partisan components. See Appendix II for a fuller explanation.

Figure 2. The Normal Vote and Escalation/De-escalation




Item: "Which of the following do you think we should do now in Vietnam?"
 1. Pull out of Vietnam entirely.
 4. Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting.
 7. Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam.

titudes on escalation vs. de-escalation is evident. Among those who wanted to pull out entirely, Humphrey's vote is 12 percentage points lower than expected. Among those who would consider invading North Vietnam (34 per cent of the total sample), Humphrey's vote is almost 24 percentage points below its expected level. Humphrey's best showing is among the advocates of a policy of keeping American soldiers in Vietnam while trying to end the fighting. This one might interpret as a status quo position, a position with which the public apparently identified Humphrey because he was a member of an administration pursuing a similar policy.¹⁴

Obviously, Humphrey fared more poorly among the proponents of escalation than he did among those of de-escalation. His showing was weakest among the advocates of escalation, who outnumbered the advocates of de-escalation by nearly 2:1 among the voters. In addition, the proponents of escalation gave both

¹⁴ Rosenberg, Verba, and Converse argue, "... Vietnam as an issue played little role in deciding the election between Nixon and Humphrey... because voters perceived little difference between the candidates." Milton J. Rosenberg, Sidney Verba, and Philip E. Converse, *Vietnam and the Silent Majority* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 50. Even though the voters saw little difference between the two candidates on Vietnam, the normal vote analysis shows that people at odds with the war policy still punished Humphrey at the polls. For an analysis of the relationship of views on the war to modes of political participation, see Sidney Verba and Richard Brody, "Participation, Policy Preferences, and the War in Vietnam," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 34 (Fall, 1970), 325-32.

Figure 3. The Normal Vote and Immediate Withdrawal/Military Victory



Item: "There is much talk about 'hawks' and 'doves' in connection with Vietnam, and considerable disagreement as to what action the United States should take in Vietnam. Some people think we should do everything necessary to win a *complete military victory*, no matter what results. Some people think we should *withdraw completely* from Vietnam right now, no matter what results. And, of course, other people have opinions somewhere between these two extreme positions. Suppose the people who support an immediate withdrawal are at one end of this scale (Show card #4 to R) at point number 1. And suppose the people who support a complete military victory are at the other end of the scale at point number 7. Where would you place yourself [on this scale]?"

Nixon and Wallace the greatest proportion of votes they received from any of the other opinion groups (51 and 18 per cent respectively).

The second Vietnam item yields results that are much like those of the first. This item asks the respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale whose extreme positions are described as "immediate withdrawal" vs. "complete military victory." Figure 3 presents the normal vote breakdown for this issue. The expected or normal Democratic vote across the seven positions varies more or less randomly. As in the previous Vietnam item, the critical component of the issue is its relation to departures from the normal vote. Humphrey sustained his principal losses on the escalation flank; his fewest (49 versus an expected vote of 53 per cent), from a position just left of center. As in the case of the first Vietnam item, the advocates of immediate withdrawal gave Humphrey much more support than did the proponents of military victory. Figure 4 details the pattern of losses on the left and right with a


graph of the differences between the expected and the actual Democratic vote on both items.

Urban Unrest and Race: The Future of American Politics. Beliefs concerning urban unrest and race are central to an analysis of the 1968 election; these issues had an unmistakable short-term relationship to the vote, and they appear likely to dominate American politics for years to come. As has often been suggested, it is quite possible that the present Democratic party, based as it is upon a New Deal assemblage of class, ethnic, and regional groups, cannot withstand the impact of these issues on its blue-collar members. The problem of the Democratic party is evidenced in the following analysis.

Figure 1, the example used earlier to explain the concept of a normal vote, illustrates the loss of Democratic support among people who thought that civil rights leaders were pushing their cause too swiftly. The same voting pattern is manifested by people who advocated the use of all available force to quell urban unrest. Figure 5 presents a normal vote analysis of people who were asked to place themselves upon a seven-point continuum concerning alternatives for dealing with the urban problem. One end of the continuum is demarcated by "correct the problems of poverty and unemployment that give rise to the disturbances;" the other, by "use all available force to maintain law and order—no matter what results."¹⁵ As Figure 5

¹⁵ Two caveats about the item, itself. One is that it poses alternatives that may not stand as such in the minds of the voters. People may distinguish between long- and short-run solutions to riots, advocating use of force as an immediate measure and alleviation of poverty as a longer-run solution. A second difficulty


Figure 4. Deviations from the Expected Democratic Vote on Two Vietnam War Items.



Each line is a plot of the deviation of the expected Democratic vote from the observed Democratic vote. The two lines represent the following items:

1. Escalation vs. de-escalation. See Figure 2 for the item.
2. Immediate withdrawal vs. military victory. See Figure 3 for the item.

Figure 5. The Normal Vote and Urban Unrest



Item: "There is much discussion about the best way to deal with the problem of urban unrest and rioting. Some say it is more important to *use all available force* to maintain law and order—no matter what results. Others say it is more important to *correct the problems* of poverty and unemployment that give rise to the disturbances. And, of course, other people have opinions in between. Suppose the people who stress the use of force are at one end of this scale—at point number 7 (Show card #3 to R). And suppose the people who stress doing more about the problems of poverty and unemployment are at the other end—at point number 1. Where would you place [yourself] on this scale?"

demonstrates, Humphrey captured a substantial majority of the votes of those endorsing a "correct-the-problems" approach. In contrast, he suffered massive losses (34 percentage points) among the advocates of the polar position of force as the solution. Humphrey lost the bulk of these normally Democratic votes to Wallace rather than to Nixon. Nixon pulled his strongest support toward the midrange of the scale, while Wallace's strength peaked at the polar right of the continuum. Among the people of

with the item is its penumbra of social welfare content. It clearly presumes that poverty and unemployment are causes of riots and that solving these problems will still them. As anyone knows who has plunged into the ballooning literature on urban violence, competing explanations abound. The gamut ranges from the riff-raff theories of everyman to the exotic aggression theories of the animal behaviorists.


One case for the validity of the item is the pattern of the Wallace vote. The smooth, curvilinear increase in the Wallace vote in Figure 5 indicates that his supporters had no difficulty in interpreting the item. Second, as Figure 6 demonstrates, the vote on this item is quite similar to the vote on the other four items in this set of urban unrest and race issues. Appendix I presents the inter-item associations of this item with others in the race and urban unrest set.

the polar right, Wallace captured so many normally Republican votes that Nixon also fell short of his party's expected strength.

The 1968 SRC election study is rich in items on racial attitudes. In addition to the previous items on speed of movement on civil rights and urban unrest, other questions probe attitudes on segregation in general, attitudes on residential segregation in particular, and perceptions of Negro violence. Since all yield a consistent result under normal vote analysis, Figure 6 presents a composite picture of the vote on racial issues. Each line is a plot of the deviation of the expected Democratic vote from the observed Democratic vote.

In sum, in an election in which many issues held the public's attention, race and urban attitudes were indisputably important. In competition with a number of salient issues, urban un-

Figure 6. Deviations from the Expected Democratic Vote on Five Racial and Urban Unrest Items.



Each line is a plot of the deviation of the expected Democratic vote from the observed Democratic vote. The five lines represent the following items:

1. Moving too fast on civil rights. See Figure 1 for the item.
2. Urban unrest item. See Figure 5 for the item.
3. "During the past year or so, would you say that most of the actions Negroes have taken to get the things they want have been violent, or have most of these actions been peaceful?"
 1. Most have been peaceful. (318/217)
4. Some violent, some peaceful. (This category is omitted for want of a sufficient number of cases.)
 7. Most have been violent. (1052/694)
4. "What about you: Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?"
 1. Desegregation. (539/399)
 4. In between. (689/462)
 7. Segregation. (232/131)
5. "Which of these statements would you agree with?"
 1. Negroes have a right to live wherever they can afford to, just like anybody else. (1042/733)
 4. Don't know; depends; can't decide. (147/94)
 7. White people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to. (339/200)

rest ranks second, belief in segregation ranks fourth, and speed of movement on civil rights ranks sixth in the magnitude of their relationship to defections from the normal vote. Herein may be read the Wallace story. As Converse and others note, in both the North and the South, the Wallace vote came predominantly from Democrats. Nixon rather than Humphrey was the second preference for most of these Democratic Wallace voters. For a third it was at least their second consecutive defection from their national presidential ticket.¹⁶

In the South racial issues dominated all others in 1968. The items on belief in segregation, speed of movement on civil rights, and urban unrest rank first, second, and third, respectively, in their relation to short-term deviations from the normal party vote.¹⁷ Despite that fact, the South also leads the nation in party polarization on racial issues, with Southern Republicans being located farther to the right of Southern Democrats than Northern Republicans are to the right of Northern Democrats.

Civil Liberties and Public Protest. It is instructive to compare the issues of race and civil rights with those of civil liberties and public protest. The protests against the war in Vietnam contributed to the chain of events leading to Johnson's renunciation; the riots in the streets of Chicago during the Democratic convention left the party demoralized.¹⁸ Thus, the protesters

¹⁶ Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics," p. 1091. Utilizing sample surveys conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation, Brody and his associates analyzed the effect on evaluations of the candidates in 1968 of urban unrest and immediate withdrawal vs. military victory items identical to those in Figures 3 and 5. Their findings are quite consistent with my own. Richard A. Brody, Benjamin I. Page, Sidney Verba, and Jerome Lulicht, "Vietnam, the Urban Crisis and the 1968 Presidential Election: A Preliminary Analysis," paper delivered at the American Sociological Association Meeting, 1969, pp. 1-32. Other analyses of race and the 1968 elections include Weisburg and Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation"; Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, "The Wallace Whitelash"; and Arthur G. Wolfe, "Challenge from the Right: The Basis of Voter Support for Wallace in 1968," paper delivered at the American Psychological Association Meeting, Washington, D.C., 1969, pp. 1-20.

¹⁷ The reader might wonder about contaminating interaction effects of sectionalism on many of these issues. Separate normal vote analyses were run for the South and non-South on every item. While the magnitude of the partisan and short-term components differed between the regions somewhat, the basic pattern of the components was remarkably similar on all the issues. That is, issues that were partisan in the non-South were also partisan in the South; defection from the normal vote occurred among the same attitude groups in both regions. This is further evidence for the contention of V. O. Key that, racial attitudes aside, the political atti-

may rightly call their effects major ones. But however much the protests may have cost Johnson and his party, they redounded against the protesters as well. Converse et al., and Robinson, underline the antipathy generated by the activities of the demonstrators. Even those who would say that we made a mistake in getting involved in Vietnam and that we ought to pull out immediately supported the actions of the Chicago police. Seventy per cent of this group rejected the suggestion that "too much force" was used by the police; 40 per cent of them would even say that "not enough force" was used to suppress the demonstrators.¹⁹ Wallace, of course, made these protesters the butt of his potent attacks. What then was the relation of these hostile reactions to the vote?

The 1968 election study includes a series of three items concerning the legitimacy of public protests. With respect to each form of protest the respondents are asked to state whether or not they approve its use. The series begins with "protest meetings and marches that are permitted by the local authorities" and ends with "sit-ins, mass meetings, and demonstrations," presuming "all other methods have failed." Figure 7 presents a normal vote analysis of these attitudes.

Surprisingly, the relationship of these issues to the vote is marginal—marginal at least in comparison with others. Of the 15 issues analyzed here, the items for legal meetings and marches, civil disobedience, and mass demonstrations rank respectively twelfth, fourteenth, and fifteenth in the magnitude of their relationships to defections from the normal vote. As one can see from Figure 7, Humphrey fared somewhat better among those who approved of public protest than among those who did not. In the main, however, he lost consistently across all categories of approval and disapproval of protest methods (the gap between the expected Democratic vote [ED] and his observed vote [OD]). The implication of this uniform loss is that other issues were responsible for his defeat.

The failure of civil liberties to surface as a short-term issue in 1968 parallels the fate of internal communism in the early 1950s. In 1952

the Republican party attacked the Democrats with the slogan of "Communism, Corruption and Korea." Yet, Campbell et al. found that only three per cent of the population mentioned in their evaluations of the candidates and parties the argument that the Democratic administration had been "soft on communism."²⁰ Similarly in a survey conducted in 1954, Stouffer reported that less than one per cent of the population said they were worried about the threat of Communists in the United States.²¹ This evidence from surveys is supported by Louis Bean's analyses of aggregate voting returns and Joseph McCarthy's campaigning. Bean concluded that McCarthy's campaigns in 13 states outside the South in 1952 had no effect on the presidential contest and, if anything, hurt the Republican senatorial candidates he had endorsed.²²

In all likelihood, the reason that these civil liberties and protest items are unrelated to defections from the normal vote is that they have rarely if ever been partisan issues. Democrats are slightly more willing to tolerate these acts than are Republicans. On the whole, however, the public speaks with a single voice against the protests. Not even 10 per cent of the college educated—the principal supporters of tolerance of civil liberties—approve, if asked, of mass demonstrations. Since attitudes on these valence issues are not linked to either parties or candidates, their impact does not extend to the vote itself, though the political system surely feels their force in other ways.

Social Welfare and the Federal Role: The Persistence of Traditional Issues. If the emerging issues of race, the cities, and the war were important to the 1968 election, what of the traditional issues of the post-Depression period? Since the realignment of 1928–36, much of the conflict between the parties has centered upon two broad issues: (1) What is the public responsibility to the private individual for the calamities that can befall him—from economic dislocation, sickness, unemployment, injury, indigence? (2) If there is a public responsibility in these matters, what level of government car-

tudes of Southerners are very similar to those of people outside the South. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, pp. 99–105.

¹⁹ Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President 1968* (New York: Atheneum, 1969), Chaps. 4 and 9.


²⁰ John P. Robinson, "Public Reaction to Political Protest: Chicago 1968," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Spring, 1970), 1–9. Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics," p. 1087.

²¹ Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 52.

²² Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963), p. 59.

²³ Louis H. Bean, *Influences in the 1954 Mid-Term Elections* (Washington: Public Affairs Institute, 1954), p. 22. This conclusion is supported by Nelson W. Polsby, "Towards an Explanation of McCarthyism," *Political Studies*, 8 (Oct., 1960), 250–71.

Figure 7. The Normal Vote and Civil Liberties Issues



Item: "There are many possible ways for people to show their disapproval or disagreement with governmental policies and actions. I am going to describe three ways. We would like to know which ones you approve of as ways of showing dissatisfaction with the government, and which ones you disapprove of."

- A. "How about taking part in protest meetings or marches that are permitted by the local authorities?"
- B. "How about refusing to obey a law which one thinks is unjust, if the person feels so strongly about it that he is willing to go to jail rather than obey the law?"
- C. "Suppose all other methods have failed and the person decides to try to stop the government from going about its usual activities with sit-ins, mass meetings, demonstrations, and things like that?"

ries its burden? The answers of the majority Democratic party have been that there is a proper governmental role in these matters, a role of the national government. Out of this majority have come federal programs such as farm price supports, old age and survivors' insurance, unemployment compensation, and Medicare. The Republican party has, for the most part, resisted the expansion of the federal role at each stage. Because of this continuing conflict, these issues still stand out as the major, long-term issues dividing the parties' adherents.

Figure 8 underlines the long-term, partisan nature of these federal role issues. Again, the measure of the partisan component of an issue is the degree of change in the expected Democratic vote across various positions on the issue (line ED in Figure 8). For the four issues, the difference in the expected Democratic vote between those who would expand the federal government's role and those who would not averages almost 20 percentage points. From a 1958 sample, McClosky observed that the mass membership of the two parties did not differ on issues.²³ This was clearly not the case for federal role issues a decade later.

One might predict the partisan component of these traditional issues; more surprising is their uniformly high relationship to defections from the normal vote. Note, in Figure 8, Humphrey's consistent losses among voters endorsing a limited role for federal activities. In every case the difference between the expected (ED) and the observed Democratic vote (OD) exceeds 20 percentage points. In contrast, Humphrey did quite well among those supporters of a broad scope of federal activities—barely falling short of his expected strength and, in every case, capturing a comfortable majority of the vote. In an election in which race, law and order, and the war loomed on the scene, the more traditional issues seemed reluctant to leave quietly.

The presence of the short-run component of the federal role issues suggests the possibility of spurious association. The conservative positions on these federal role-social welfare issues are associated with four other positions: opposition to civil rights, use of force in dealing with urban unrest, escalation of the war, and a harsh evaluation of Johnson's performance as president.²⁴ All of the latter issues were highly re-

²³ McClosky et al., "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," pp. 418-19. McClosky did find some differences between the party followings on "bread and butter" issues such as farm prices, business regulation, taxes, and minimum wages. These differences are minor compared to the differences presented in Figure 8, however.

²⁴ See Figures 1, 5, 2, and 9 respectively for the exact wordings of the items.

lated to short-term defections from the normal vote in 1968. To check against the possibility that the federal role issues manifest a short-term component only because of their association with the others, separate normal vote analyses of the federal role issues were run within categories of the other issues. Uniformly, the short-term component of the federal role issues remained as strong as in the uncontrolled case.

In sum, the traditional set of attitudes relating to the scope of the federal government persisted as a significant force in the 1968 election. In an election supposedly dominated by urban unrest and the war, why was this so? Perhaps one clue lies in the votes that Humphrey did *not* lose rather than those he did.

In late September, Humphrey's cause looked hopeless. A Gallup poll showed him trailing Nixon by a margin of 43 to 28 per cent and leading Wallace by only seven percentage points. Scarcely a month later, he lost the election by less than one per cent of the popular vote. As Theodore White chronicles the last month of the campaign, Humphrey attacked the Republicans with an echo of the 1964 campaign, the alleged Republican indifference to the traditional issues of social security and social welfare.²⁵

Meanwhile, the AFL/CIO had mounted a two-pronged assault on Wallace and Nixon. First, the AFL/CIO carried a message—Wallace and Nixon were no friends of labor. Second, COPE took over much of the effort of mobilizing the electorate, particularly the Black vote. In White's words,


The dimension of the AFL/CIO effort, unprecedented in American history, can be caught only by its final summary figures; the ultimate registration, by labor's efforts, of 4.6 million voters; the printing and distribution of 55 million pamphlets and leaflets out of Washington and 60 million more from local unions; telephone banks in 638 localities using 8,055 telephones, manned by 24,611 union men and women and their families; some 72,225 house-to-house canvassers; and, on election day, 94,457 volunteers serving as car-poolers, materials-distributors, baby-sitters, poll-watchers, telephoners.²⁶

A cross-sectional sample such as this one cannot establish who changed their minds during that last month of the campaign. Yet, the appeals of Humphrey were the traditional ones of the old Democratic coalition. Herein may rest the importance of the short-term effects of social welfare-federal role issues. Humphrey and organized labor used them to counter the new issues—successfully so among those Democrats

²⁵ White, *Making of the President, 1968*, p. 371.

²⁶ White, p. 365.

Figure 8. The Normal Vote and Federal Role in Social Welfare*



* Because of small cell sizes the intermediate response categories, "it depends" or "both," are omitted from this figure.

Item: A. "Some say the government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost; others say the government should not get into this . . . What is your position?"

B. "In general, some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on his own . . . What is your position?"

C. "Some people think the government in Washington should help towns and cities provide education for grade and high school children; others think this should be handled by the states and local communities . . . Which are you in favor of?"

D. "Some people are afraid the government in Washington is getting too powerful for the good of the country and the individual person. Others feel the government in Washington is not getting too strong for the good of the country . . . What is your feeling?"

for whom the traditional social welfare issues remained important.²⁷ In this respect the trend in 1968 bore a notable similarity to Truman's late surge in 1948. In their Elmira study Berelson et al. document the basis of Truman's "Fair Deal Rally." They found the swing to Truman to be sharpest among those for whom class issues were most salient.²⁸


Evaluations of Johnson's Performance as President: Humphrey in Johnson's Shadow. The final issue is the public's evaluation of Johnson's performance as president. The identification of Humphrey with Johnson in the public's mind proved to be one of the most intractable of Humphrey's problems. Politically, people saw them as a single person; indeed, their judgment of Humphrey correlated with that of Johnson at a level of .70, a figure that exceeded the association of any of the candidates with their own running mates.²⁹ Throughout the month of September, observers wrote of the price that Humphrey seemed to be paying for the unpopularity of Johnson and the war. According to Theodore White, he was heckled at nearly every speaking engagement during that month. The Salt Lake City speech of September 30 was Humphrey's major attempt to assert his independence of Johnson's policies. While the speech may have given him some respite from dis-sidence, his association with Johnson appeared to remain a major burden. The consequence of Humphrey's perceived identity with Johnson is graphically illustrated in Figure 9. People who characterized Johnson's performance as "very good" gave Humphrey even more than his expected share of the vote. From that point Humphrey's vote plummeted in an almost linear fashion as the severity of judgment of Johnson mounted. From those who judged Johnson's performance as "poor" or "very poor," Humphrey received only a small fraction of the normal Democratic strength. Of all the issues considered in this analysis, this one bears the great-

²⁷ Kevin Phillips's view is the same. "Fears that a Republican administration would undermine Social Security, Medicare, collective bargaining, and aid to education played a major part in keeping socially conservative blue-collar workers and senior citizens loyal to the 1968 Democratic candidate." Kevin P. Phillips, *The Emerging Republican Majority* (Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969), p. 464.

²⁸ Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), Chap. 12.

²⁹ The correlation is between evaluations of Johnson and Humphrey on the SRC "feeling thermometer." Weisburg and Rusk, "Dimensions of Candidate Evaluation," p. 1173.

Figure 9. The Normal Vote and Evaluation of LBJ's Performance



Item: "In general, how do you feel about how President Johnson has done his job. Would you rate his handling of America's problems over the past four years as very good, good, fair, poor, or very poor?"

est relationship to defections from the normal vote.

Humphrey's fate may represent a case of a more general phenomenon—that the unpopularity of leaders transfers to their successors more readily than does their popularity. For example, those who thought well of Johnson's performance outnumbered those who thought poorly of it by a comfortable margin. However, Johnson's admirers gave Humphrey only a normal Democratic vote, while his detractors voted heavily against him.

Indeed, it may be a contribution to party responsibility and competition that blame's retribution survives credit's reward.³⁰ Parties are more likely to be sensitive to public opinion, if they believe popularity dissipates quickly, while political blunders endure in the public mind. In the process of governing, the party in power collects enemies faster than friends.

³⁰ We might call this the Barkley Effect, after Alben Barkley's tale of a constituent he had befriended many times who expressed to Barkley an intention to vote against Barkley in a forthcoming election. When Barkley reminded him of the many favors he had given the man in the past, the constituent responded, "Yeah, but what in hell have you done for me lately?" The story is quoted in Donald Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960), p. 218.

In this vein the authors of *The American Voter* rely on the persistence of negative attitudes to explain the inexorable decline of majorities.³¹ Thus, we have an explanation of the restoring forces that seem to create an equilibrium among competing American parties over time.³²

Popular Control of Public Policy

Thus far, I have described the relationship of a group of issues to the 1968 vote. The strongest of these were the public's evaluation of Johnson's performance as president, reaction to the Vietnam war, and attitudes toward race and urban unrest. At this time and place, a set of conditions converged creating the unusual in politics—a cluster of issues so salient and crystallized that the popular vote for the candidate of the majority Democratic party barely exceeded 40 per cent.

In a more speculative vein, it is interesting to ponder the second major inquiry of the paper—the relationship of public attitudes to popular control of governmental policy. The problem is posed by V. O. Key's classic question: If governmental policy corrodes the vitality of a society, who is the villain—the public or its political leaders?³³ To conclude that it is the public requires evidence, Key argues, that the public severely limits the discretion of policy makers. Yet, from survey data Key notes that substantial portions of the public are unconcerned

and uninformed about most concrete policies of government. Whatever limits opinion fixes, governments still enjoy wide latitude in the determination of whether to act, when to act, and what exactly to do. Thus Key concludes, leaders cannot excuse their actions by pleading the hampering restrictions of public opinion.

Key's formulation of the problem of responsibility for policy has its difficulties. One is the factual problem of distinguishing different degrees on a continuum of popular constraints on leaders' policy options. The difficulty of this judgment is lessened if the continuum is divided into three broad categories: (1) issues on which people exercise no important constraints and, thus, have no voice; (2) issues on which people have voice, but permit political leaders a wide array of policy options; and (3) issues on which voters do severely restrict the options of leaders.

Regardless of the extent of popular control over policy, a second, ethical issue remains. If we can agree that the public should not be held responsible for policy when leaders possess an array of options (categories 1 and 2), what of the case in which leaders' options are severely restricted? Many would surely argue that leaders are morally responsible for public policies no matter how much the public seems to force their hands. I will not take up this issue except to assert that severe public constraints on policy options is a *necessary* condition for holding the public responsible for a policy. Whether or not that condition is sufficient remains problematic. Caveats considered, let us turn to examples in the 1968 election of the three categories of popular control over policy.

(1) On many, perhaps most, governmental policies, the public as an electorate has *no voice*. On these policies, only the few have influence because the many have no interest and no information. Issues that do not impinge upon people's economic needs or ego defenses fall into this category, as do, no doubt, policies of abstruse complexity. Foreign policies in peace time, strategic decisions, esoteric regulatory rules—these sorts of issues are not likely to engage popular attention even though they may have a substantial impact on people's lives in the long run. Certainly political leaders must bear full responsibility for failures in policy in these areas.

(2) On other issues the public does find its voice, but it still leaves political leaders with so many options that leaders retain responsibility for the success of their choices. This interpretation of the relationship of popular preference and public policy is consistent with the views of

³¹ Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, pp. 554–55.

³² For further empirical evidence of party equilibrium, see the list compiled by Stokes and Iverson, "On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition," in Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 180–93. For other explanations of party equilibrium, see the list compiled by Stokes and Iverson, p. 181. See also the discussion of E. E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942) pp. 93–98. Schattschneider explains the recuperative powers of the second major party in terms of its monopoly of opposition and the disadvantages for the party in power of a large majority. This latter point is one of the early statements of the size principle derived by William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), pp. 32–76.

³³ V. O. Key, Jr., "Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 37 (Autumn, 1961), 481–94. A shorter presentation of the argument appears in his book, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, pp. 555–58. One might wonder what Key means by the failure of public policy: is failure defined by some objective standard or is it subjectively defined by people? This raises all the thorny problems of an interpersonal comparison of utilities and a social welfare function. Key seems to have some objective standard in mind, although he does not suggest who determines failure in any particular instance. I am more interested here in the issue of who influences policy making than the evaluation of the merits of policy. For the purposes of this discussion, evaluation is presumed to be the prerogative of each voter.

Key and many other voting analysts.³⁴ In the main, policy initiatives lie with the leaders, not voters. After a policy is enacted, voters make a retrospective evaluation of its success. The electorate's influence over such a policy is the leaders' anticipation of voters' reactions in the following election,³⁵ when voters will ask themselves, "How did the party in office do, and how likely is it that the opposition party would have done better?" An archetypal example is Humphrey's loss of support among voters who ranked Johnson's presidential performance as poor. It is in this sense that Key remarked, "The vocabulary of the people consists mainly of the words 'yes' and 'no'; and at times one cannot be certain which word is being uttered."³⁶

Vietnam may be another example of an issue on which the electorate retrospectively said "no" to governmental policy. This interpretation is necessarily tentative because people make voting decisions across a range of issues. As a result, a majority may vote for a man in spite of his position on an issue, not because of it.³⁷ Thus, even when one limits the interpretation of the vote to "yes" and "no," it is difficult to infer conclusively what the judgment is on any particular issue. On the matter of Vietnam policy alternatives, one can only speculate

³⁴ This presentation owes much to a lucid discussion by Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1968), Chap. 10. To use Tingsten's phrase (if not all of the rationale that produced it), "The public . . . [is a] consumer rather than [a] producer of political demands and candidates." Herbert Tingsten, *The Problem of Democracy* (Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster Press, 1965), p. 198. See also, Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, pp. 472-78; Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston: Little, Brown 1964), Chap. 7; Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), Chap. 3; and R. J. Benewick, A. H. Birch, J. G. Blumler, and Alison Ewbank, "The Floating Voter and the Liberal View of Representation," *Political Studies*, 17 (June, 1969), 177-195.

³⁵ Friedrich's Rule of Anticipated Reactions. Carl J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), pp. 199-215.


³⁶ V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964), p. 544. The quote also appears in Pomper, *Elections in America*, p. 252.

³⁷ A party could win an electoral majority by systematically taking positions favored by a minority. Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 124-31. This situation Downs calls a "coalition of minorities." It stands as a contrast to a "passionate majority," which occurs only when there is a consensus on which issues are important as well as a consensus of preferences on the issues. Downs, *Economic Theory of Democracy*, pp. 64-69.

about the nature of constraints posed by past and future elections.

On the eve of the 1964 election, only 20,000 American soldiers were in Vietnam, and President Johnson was campaigning on pledges against fighting Asian wars with American boys. What could the 1964 vote have told him about popular support for various war options? In brief, it could have told him anything he cared to believe.

Figure 10. The Normal Vote and Escalation/De-escalation in 1964



Item: "Which of the following do you think we should do now in Vietnam?"

1. Pull out of Vietnam entirely.
2. Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting.
7. Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam.

Figure 10 presents a normal vote analysis of the escalation/de-escalation issue in 1964. The data could be interpreted as support for "pull [ing] out of Vietnam entirely." Johnson received 62 per cent of the votes from the proponents of this option—a substantial majority, and three percentage points better than a normal vote would have predicted. On the other hand, the data also show strong support for "keep[ing] our soldiers in Vietnam but try[ing] to end the fighting." From this group he received a startling 82 per cent of the vote, 18 percentage points more than a normal vote would have predicted. Finally, the data also reveal popular support for the option of "tak[ing] a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam." Although he failed to win the expected Democratic vote

within this group, he still claimed a majority. And, it should be noted, the advocates of escalation easily numbered the largest of the war opinion groups. Looking at the 1964 data and noting Pomper's evidence that 1964 Johnson voters were still supporting Johnson's policies in 1966, one must conclude, as Pomper did, that Johnson did not violate an electoral mandate in spite of the fact that he ignored his own campaign pledges.³⁸ The 1964 election foreclosed none of Johnson's war options. He and other political leaders formulated the escalation policy and rightly should have borne full electoral responsibility for it.

By 1968, escalation had changed the context of the options confronting the electorate. Rather than 20,000 men in Vietnam, there were 530,000. Sixteen thousand men had died, and America's prestige was at stake. As we have seen, the public's reaction to a continuation of the existing war policy was negative. Humphrey won a majority of the votes of people endorsing a centrist, status quo alternative: "keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting." He fared less well among those who would pull out entirely; he fared disastrously among those who would escalate the war still further, a group of voters who gave both Wallace and Nixon the greatest proportions they received from any Vietnam attitude category. (See Figure 2.) The common thread of the views of those who deserted Humphrey—people who would withdraw rapidly or who would sharply escalate the fighting—would seem to be a desire to end the engagement quickly. As in the Korean war, an official Vietnam policy of a war of limited aims and lengthy duration confronted a public unwilling to support war on those terms.³⁹

Though one cannot marshal evidence about events that never happened, the Johnson Administration appeared to lose more electoral support by its pursuit of an extended limited war than it would have lost either by a policy of withdrawal (even after the buildup of men) or by a precipitous escalation of the conflict. This view of the electoral dangers of limited conflict is consistent with the views of Key, Kahn, and Brzezinski and Huntington.⁴⁰ The

public does not necessarily *prescribe* a particular policy, but it can *proscribe* a policy—e.g., the option of extended limited war. Even after the 1968 election, Rosenberg, Verba, and Converse argued that policy makers retained a wide array of options for ending the war.⁴¹

... the President is not particularly pressured by public opinion to engage in one kind of policy rather than another—to escalate or to de-escalate the war. Rather, the public would support a variety of initiatives. What the public wants is an end to the war. Thus it will judge the policies of the President retrospectively in terms of how successful they are in this direction.

If political leaders possessed a wide array of options in Vietnam, then are there issues on which the electorate does severely limit the options of political leaders? If there are, what must the structure of political attitudes on such an issue be? For this close relationship of opinion to policy to exist, the following conditions are surely necessary: (1) A substantial number of people must have intense views about specific policy alternatives. (2) People must have information about the views of competing candidates on the issue. (3) These attitudes must be fairly impervious to short-run manipulation by political leaders. (4) The balance of opinion on the issue must be such that the winning candidate's choice of an issue position significantly

cal Power: USA/USSR (New York: Viking Press, 1964), p. 414. These and other writers are discussed in a good article on this issue, Kenneth N. Waltz, "Electoral Punishment and Foreign Policy Crises," in Rosenau, pp. 263-294. Waltz does not agree with the general conclusion that the public will not support a limited war. Rather, he blames the lack of broad-based support for the Korean War on the failure of the Truman administration to explain its policy adequately to the public because of his administration's own uncertainty over its goals (pp. 279-80). Waltz does not, however, either have any direct evidence about the impact of opinion on votes or any indirect evidence about the intensity of opinion on these issues. Lacking this type of information, one cannot easily judge how governmental policy will affect votes or how votes will affect policy. This same problem confronts those who have found permissive majorities supporting the Vietnam war. See, for example, Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon S. Black, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (June, 1967), 321, and William R. Caspary, "The 'Mood Theory': A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 546. For a sobering discussion of the difficulties of interpreting the significance of opinion polls and support for the Vietnam War, see Philip E. Converse and Howard Schuman, "Silent Majorities and the Vietnam War," *Scientific American*, 222 (June, 1970), 17-25.

⁴¹ Rosenberg, Converse, and Verba, *Vietnam and the Silent Majority*, p. 38.

³⁸ Pomper, *Elections in America*, p. 252.

³⁹ See the discussion of the electoral impact of the Korean War by Warren E. Miller, "Voting and Foreign Policy," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, ed. James Rosenau, (New York: The Free Press, 1967), pp. 213-30.

⁴⁰ Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, p. 261; Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 418; Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Politi-*

affects his probability of being elected. Clearly, these are necessary, not sufficient, conditions for influencing policy through the electoral process. There are other channels for influencing policy in our system, all with their own conditions.

What contemporary issues might satisfy these four conditions? The issues of race and public order seem the obvious candidates. Even in the quiescent period of the late 1950s, there was evidence of a close relationship between opinion and policy on racial attitudes. Miller and Stokes, for instance, found a correlation of .65 between congressional roll-call votes and constituency opinion on civil rights issues.⁴² Furthermore, the link between the two was the representatives' inclination to vote their *perceptions* of their constituencies' opinion; they were not simply voting their own attitudes, which happened to coincide with the majority opinion in their districts. Let us see how the race issue in the elections of 1964 and 1968 might satisfy the four conditions:


(1) *A substantial number of people must have intense views about specific policy alternatives.* Survey questions are rarely framed in a manner that presents reliable evidence on either the direction or the intensity of views on specific policies. One exception in the 1964 SRC election study is a set of items probing knowledge of and support for the 1964 Public Accommodations Law. All but 23 per cent said they knew of the new law (and as shown below, their knowledge of the candidates' stands indicates people were not simply giving the socially desirable answer). Of those having an opinion on the law, 90 per cent said their minds were made up. No such questions were asked in the SRC election studies on the 1965 Voting Rights Law or the 1968 Open Housing Law. Nevertheless, we can be reasonably confident that the controversies over their passage served to crystalize intense views on these policies. Negroes voted more than 90 per cent Democratic in 1964 and 1968, a display of cohesion that reflects the interests they saw at stake in the two elections.⁴³

⁴² Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," in Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order*, p. 359.

⁴³ Actually, the 1964 SRC sample does not include a single Negro Goldwater voter. Fred I. Greenstein, *The American Party System and the American People*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 26. In France, religion has been an issue having a similar degree of crystallization and polarization. See Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," in Campbell et al., *Elections and the Political Order*, pp. 289-90.

(2) *People must have information about the views of competing candidates on the issue.* In 1964 the level of information on the public accommodations law was remarkably high. Of the 77 per cent who said they had heard of the law, 95 per cent knew Johnson favored it and 84 per cent knew Goldwater opposed it. Even in 1968, when differences between the Republican and the Democratic candidates were less striking, voters had little trouble sorting out the candidates' stands on racial issues. Figure 11 presents a distribution of people's perceptions of the candidates' positions on the urban unrest issue. The modal perceptions of Humphrey, Nixon, and Wallace were distinctly left, center, and right, respectively—perceptions that were quite accurate in view of the different positions of the parties and the candidates on issues of race and urban violence.⁴⁴ If one limits the sample to those who viewed the race issue as important in determining their vote, the distinctness of the perceived differences among the candidates is even more pronounced.

Figure 11. Distribution of Perceptions of Candidates' Stands on Urban Unrest



Item: See Figure 5.

(3) *Attitudes on the issue must be fairly impervious to short-run manipulation by elites.* Almost every survey of the literature on mass persuasion emphasizes the difficulty of chan-

⁴⁴ Sources of platform and campaign positions are White, *Making of the President 1968*, Lewis Chester, Godfrey Hodgson, and Bruce Page, *An American Melodrama* (New York: Viking Press, 1969); *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, pp. 942-1046; and *The Presidential Nominating Convention: 1968* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1968).

ging popular attitudes when attitudes are well formed and when the time available to the elites is reasonably short (as in a campaign).⁴⁵ Certainly, racial attitudes should be among the most difficult for opinion leaders to influence, for they are learned early in life and are often central to people's ego defenses.⁴⁶ Thus, we can be reasonably sure that if we discover a close relationship between popular attitudes and the enactment of public policies on race issues, the link cannot be explained away by arguing that political leaders persuaded voters to support policies the voters previously resisted.

(4) *The balance of opinion on the issue must be such that the winning candidate's choice of an issue position significantly affects his probability of being elected.* It is easier to state this condition than to present evidence appropriate to its test. In the first place, the importance of a particular issue in an election differs for each candidate (for example, whether, in Downs' terms, a candidate's victory is based on a "coalition of minorities" or on a "passionate majority").⁴⁷ One illustration of this problem is the difference between the importance of the race issue for Nixon and Humphrey in 1968. Nixon won the election even though he lost more than 90 per cent of the Negro vote. Presumably, Humphrey needed all of those votes to have had any prospect of victory. In the second place, we have no analytical technique for determining the effect of alternative issue positions on each candidate's electoral coalition.⁴⁸ Our only approach to the analysis of the fourth condition is an indirect one—examining the statistical relationship of beliefs on issues to votes.

In 1964 the relationships between civil rights issues and votes were substantial. The gamma association of the vote with support for the public accommodations law was .57; with the establishment of a fair employment practices commission for Negroes, .47; with views on federal enforcement for school integration, .37.

⁴⁵ Joseph T. Klapper, *The Effects of Mass Communications* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).

⁴⁶ The literature on this subject is mammoth. See Frank R. Westie, "Race and Ethnic Relations," in *Handbook of Modern Sociology*, ed. Robert E. L. Faris, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964), pp. 576-618.

⁴⁷ Downs, *Economic Theory of Democracy*, pp. 64-69.

⁴⁸ A pioneering attempt to measure the impact of issue positions on votes is found in Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel Popkin, *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies: A Computer Simulation of the 1960 and 1964 Presidential Elections* (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965). No one has completed a rigorous development of the technique, however.

These links between civil rights positions and votes continued in 1968, as I argued in the first section of this paper.

The position that racial attitudes are closely related to public policy involves an apparent contradiction. If Humphrey's losses in 1968 were statistically related to racial attitudes, why did Congress in that same year pass an open housing law covering 80 per cent of all housing units? One answer is that there is no survey evidence of an increase in the number of white people opposed to traditional civil rights goals such as public accommodations, voting rights, and open housing.⁴⁹ There is greater fear of Negro crime and urban violence. This attitude is mirrored in the fact that the open housing law contains an anti-riot section.⁵⁰ Most people apparently believe that Negroes now enjoy legal equality and that the remaining social and economic inequalities are the responsibility of Negroes themselves.⁵¹

The evidence on racial attitudes and civil rights laws is undoubtedly insufficient to support a contention that Congress scarcely had time to leap to the lead of a mob bent on liberal changes in civil rights laws. On the other hand, it is so commonly assumed that changes in public policy have *preceded* changes in public opinion on civil rights issues that a second look is warranted.⁵² The sum of the evidence indicates that racial issues were voting issues in 1964 and 1968, and that majorities of the voters supported the major civil rights laws passed in those years (though we note the warning of Converse and Schuman that the wording of an item has a major effect on which response category attracts majority support).⁵³ In my view the following argument merits attention: Congress ran few risks in its support for civil rights laws in the 1960s—not because an apathetic public paid little attention to policy proposals,

⁴⁹ Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics," p. 1086; Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "Attitudes Toward Desegregation," *Scientific American*, 211 (July, 1964), 16-23; Paul B. Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Towards the Negro," *Daedalus*, 95 (Winter, 1966), 217-38. Perhaps a proper interpretation of the backlash is that racial opinions have become increasingly salient for the declining numbers of people holding prejudiced attitudes.

⁵⁰ *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, pp. 152-68. This report contains a good description of the act and an account of the politics of its enactment.

⁵¹ *Gallup Opinion Index* (July, 1968), 19-20.

⁵² See, for example, Sheatsley, "White Attitudes Towards the Negro," p. 221. This position is rarely stated explicitly in the literature, but it is implicit in much of the evidence that political, business, and social leaders are more liberal than the public on civil rights issues.

⁵³ Converse and Schuman, "Silent Majorities' and the Vietnam War," pp. 17-25.

but because on these issues Congress carefully stayed within the relatively narrow constraints posed by a watchful electorate.

The time to test the argument on existing civil rights laws is gone, for we cannot reconstruct a public past. Yet, determining the linkage between public opinion and policy is so critical a problem that it behooves us to ask policy questions of the public. We need to ask more than general questions about political attitudes. We need to know what people think about particular policies—the levels of information, intensity, and support for specific options. Without succumbing to hopeless naiveté about the interest and information of the electorate, the opinion-policy linkage on the issues of race and public order is evidence for the rich payoff of such an approach.

Summary and Conclusions

Converse developed the concept of the normal vote in order to interpret the force of the religious issue in 1960. His challenge was to analyze voting changes between 1956 and 1960 without using 1956, a deviating election, as a baseline for the measurement of change. The normal vote, an empirical estimation of an abstract concept, became the baseline, and the impact of the religious issue was measured as a deviation from the normal vote.

The logic of the normal vote presumes that the force of issues constantly changes. This logic has been too often ignored by those who assume the immutability of political behavior. The electorate of 1956 was presented in *The American Voter* as being little moved by ideology or public issues. But 1956 was a deviating election in a quiescent political era, and it should be of little surprise to find a minimal

amount of issue voting in that apolitical period. The importance of issues in 1968 stands in striking contrast to 1956. Beliefs about Vietnam, race and urban unrest, and Johnson's performance as president were all highly related to the vote in 1968. Time has told us of the unusual nature of the 1956 election. Undoubtedly, the future will reveal the atypicality of 1968, as American parties seemed to be in a stage of realignment or disintegration. Surely we should expect issues to be more important in these times than in periods of stability in party strength. After what appears to be a transition period, issue voting may once again decline to the level of the 1950s.

A second, more speculative argument of the paper is that issues similar in the magnitude of their relationship to the vote can pose very different restrictions on the discretion of leaders in policy making. On some issues the electorate exercises no effective constraints on leaders' policy choices. On others, the electorate permits political leaders a wide array of options at the time of the adoption of policy, while passing a retrospective judgment on such choices in subsequent elections. It is argued that the issues of Vietnam and Johnson's performance as president are examples of this type of public control of policy. Finally, there may be issues on which the public rather severely limits the options of leaders at the time of the adoption of policy. It is difficult, surely, to amass the evidence necessary to determine which issues could properly be placed into this final category. If any issues of 1964 and 1968 meet the tests, race and public order do. It may be, then, that the electorate must assume final responsibility for the success with which the United States solves its racial problem.

Appendix I. Inter-Association Matrix of 15 Issues

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1		17	16	16	25	17	13	12	17	13	00	04	07	01	03
2	30		35	32	26	14	06	03	04	13	13	12	07	08	13
3	24	59		28	23	25	15	11	17	22	14	14	16	15	23
4	27	58	47		32	25	22	14	23	22	13	12	18	11	15
5	42	46	39	56		19	15	12	16	14	09	09	13	07	11
6	31	29	43	45	36		43	26	35	27	14	14	29	16	26
7	28	13	30	43	31	72		26	35	19	13	15	34	17	25
8	23	06	21	29	24	58	65		47	14	03	06	22	10	14
9	24	07	29	41	28	60	67	77		24	06	11	26	15	17
10	17	21	29	34	21	42	36	25	31		16	24	18	14	20
11	00	23	23	22	15	24	25	06	09	20		43	11	06	15
12	05	19	19	19	14	22	29	11	15	29	53		16	12	14
13	10	13	27	31	23	48	59	45	42	24	17	21		28	36
14	01	16	25	20	13	28	33	22	26	21	10	17	45		29
15	08	29	42	30	25	49	50	37	34	39	29	27	61	52	

The upper diagonal contains the Kendall Tau; the lower diagonal contains the Goodman-Kruskal Gamma. All associations are positive if the left position is defined as favoring Johnson, a strong federal role in social welfare, civil rights, de-escalation of the Vietnam war, and civil liberties. The items are the following:

1. LBJ's performance. Fig. 9.
2. Medical care. Fig. 8.
3. Standard of living. Fig. 8.
4. Aid to education. Fig. 8.
5. Power of government. Fig. 8.
6. Speed of civil rights. Fig. 1.
7. Negro violence. Fig. 6.
8. Residential segregation. Fig. 6.
9. Segregation in general. Fig. 6.
10. Urban unrest. Fig. 5.
11. Escalation/de-escalation. Fig. 2.
12. Immediate withdrawal/military victory. Fig. 3.
13. Legal marches. Fig. 7.
14. Civil disobedience. Fig. 7.
15. Mass demonstrations. Fig. 7.

Appendix II. The Comparative Importance of 15 Issues

Issue	Short-Term		Partisan or Long-Term	
	Magnitude	Rank	Magnitude	Rank
1. LBJ's performance	8.91	1	10.56	1
2. Medical care	6.40	7	9.60	2
3. Standard of living	4.73	13	6.39	6
4. Aid to education	7.03	5	8.45	4
5. Power of government	7.79	3	9.32	3
6. Speed of civil rights	6.16	8	4.13	8
7. Negro violence	5.78	10	2.90	9
8. Residential segregation	5.19	11	1.25	14
9. Segregation in general	7.01	6	4.29	7
10. Urban unrest	8.78	2	6.59	5
11. Escalation/de-escalation	7.21	4	1.18	15
12. Immediate withdrawal/military victory	6.12	9	2.70	10
13. Legal marches	4.80	12	1.65	13
14. Civil disobedience	1.06	15	2.53	11
15. Mass demonstrations	3.18	14	2.07	12

If we are to compare the importance of a series of issues, we must have a quantitative measure. The measures above, which are based on an analogue of analysis of variance, offer the advantages of having a straightforward interpretation and of reflecting the existence of different numbers of cases across issue categories.

(1) Partisan or long-term component. The long-term effect of an issue is manifest in a change in the expected Democratic proportion of the vote across issue categories. A nonlinear measure of this change is the average of the absolute values of the deviations of the expected Democratic vote in the response categories from the expected Democratic vote for the whole item sample. The importance of each category in the total average is weighted by the proportion of the total cases in that category. This simple, percentage-point average is computed in this fashion.

If:

N = Number response categories for an issue,

$E_j \dots n$ = Expected Democratic vote in each issue category j , and

$WG_j \dots n$ = Ratio of the number of party identifiers and independents in category j over the average number of party identifiers and independents in each category (the weighting factor),

Then:

$$GE = \sum_n^{j=1} E_j WG_j / N \text{ (the grand expected Democratic vote);}$$

$$L = \sum_n^{j=1} \text{Abs. Val. } (E_j - GE)(WG_j) / N \text{ (the partisan or long-term component).}$$

To use Figure 1, the long-term component of speed of movement on civil rights, as an example, the grand expected Democratic vote is 57.4 per cent. The average deviation of the expected Democratic vote in each category from 57.4 (weighted by the proportion of cases in each category) is 4.1 percentage points. If there were no change from category to category, the category expectation would be the same as the grand expectation, that is 0.0.

(2) Short-term component. The short-term component of an issue is manifest in changes in the deviation of the expected from the observed Democratic vote across issue categories. That is, for all the voters included in Figure 1, Humphrey actually received 41.0 per cent of the vote, 16.4 percentage points below his expected vote in a normal election. If Humphrey had lost this same 16.4 percentage points in every category, then other factors than this one would have to account for his deficit. Thus, the average variation of the actual losses in each category (0.5, 9.8, and 21.2 points) from the grand or overall deficit (16.4) is a measure of the

short-term component of this issue. As before, the average is weighted by the number of cases in each issue category.

If:

$WA_{j\dots n}$ = Ratio of the number of voters in category j to the average number of voters in each category (the weighting factor), and

$O_{j\dots n}$ = Observed Democratic vote in each category j ,

Then:

$$D_j = E_j - O_j;$$

$$GD = \sum_n^{j-1} (D_j)(WA_j)/N \text{ (grand deviation of the observed from the expected Democratic vote);}$$

$$S = \sum_n^{j-1} \text{Abs. Val. } (D_j - GD)(WA_j)/N \text{ (the short-term component).}$$

Rejoinder to "Comments" by Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page and John H. Kessel

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The commentaries of Kessel and of Brody and Page raise fundamental questions of normal vote analysis. Kessel is concerned with the legitimacy of applying the technique to an election contested by three major candidates, given that we have normal votes only for a Democrat and a Republican. Brody and Page emphasize the problems of disentangling cause and effect in the relationships of issue positions and vote choices. Since a reply to Brody and Page would be moot if the objection of Kessel cannot be satisfied, I shall consider Kessel's commentary first.

Two Parties, Three Candidates

If we have normal vote estimates only for the Republican and Democratic parties, how should we treat the Wallace candidacy? My solution (defended in footnote 11) was to consider the Wallace vote a short-term deviation from the expected two-party vote and to keep the observed votes of the three candidates separate. An equally plausible assumption, Kessel argues, is that the normal Democratic vote was split between non-Southern and Southern Democratic candidates and that the expected Democratic vote should be compared with the *combined* vote of Wallace and Humphrey. While adding the Humphrey and Wallace votes might seem attractive (particularly to Hubert Humphrey), this solution has its own problems.

First, Kessel's treatment of Wallace as a Southern Democratic candidate is based on a premise that Wallace's votes came predominantly from Democrats and Independents. Although Independents did vote for Wallace in large numbers, a Wallace voter was no more likely to be a Democrat than was any randomly chosen number of the electorate (see Table 1). In fact, Wallace's party coalition no more resembled Humphrey's coalition than Nixon's.

Second, treating Wallace as a Democratic candidate not only distorts the candidates' party coalitions, it conceals important differences in their *issue* coalitions as well. Note, for example, the differences in the civil rights attitudes of those who voted for the three candidates. In all, 61 per cent of the electorate endorsed the view that civil rights leaders were pushing too fast. Eighty-seven per cent of the

Table 1. The Party Coalitions in 1968

	Demo- crats	Inde- pen- dents	Repub- licans		N
Nixon Voters	17	32	51	100%	490
Humphrey Voters	78	17	5	100%	421
Wallace Voters	46	41	13	100%	116
All Party Identifiers	46	30	24	100%	1531

Data Source: 1968 SRC Election Study

Wallace voters endorsed this view, as did 66 per cent of the Nixon voters; only 49 per cent of the Humphrey voters concurred. Adding the Humphrey and the Wallace vote obscures the fact that the racial attitudes of the Wallace voters were closer to Nixon voters than to Humphrey voters.¹

Finally, Kessel notes that if the Humphrey and Wallace votes are combined, the issue of the speed of civil rights progress almost disappears as an important issue in 1968. That conclusion in itself should make one chary of not distinguishing the Wallace and the Humphrey vote. Quite obviously, without the racial issue Wallace would not even have been a candidate in 1968. Thus, while I do not wish to minimize the problem of applying the normal vote technique to the 1968 election, I would argue that Kessel's particular method of reanalyzing the data is inappropriate.

Issue Voting or Rationalization

Brody and Page are concerned with another of the intractable problems of the analysis of issue voting. In their view the evidence that issues importantly influence people's votes can be explained away by what they term rationalization. Though they never define the term precisely, rationalization appears indistinguishable from what they later call projection and persuasion. Projection occurs when a voter falsely perceives his preferred candidate's position to be his own. Persuasion takes place if a voter adopts the issue position of his preferred candidate. In both

¹This is true of all of the issues included in Figure 5 of my original article.

cases vote choices are influencing issue positions, rather than issues determining votes. Conceiving of rationalization as a response set, Brody and Page construct a test to determine whether or not rationalization in fact contaminates the evidence for issue voting. While their test tends to refute the rationalization hypothesis in the 1968 data, they have left the status of V.O. Key's work in doubt. To discuss Key's evidence, it is important to distinguish the cognitive and the affective components of attitudes.

Consider, for example, the following item from the Brody and Page commentary: "Which party can better handle the problem of keeping us out of a bigger war?" For most people, the question may be so heavily laden with affect that it has little cognitive content. It is like asking a person which of the parties he likes better in different words. Answering the question in such a way that the response correlates with one's vote requires neither interest in the issue nor any knowledge of the history of the two parties in committing the United States to war. A voter who had fixed on a voting choice would simply respond that this preferred party was better able to keep the United States out of war.

Contrast the above item with the following one, drawn from Key's analysis of the New Deal realignment: "Do you think the Wagner Act should be revised, repealed or left unchanged?"² The item gives no clues of the positions of the parties on this issue. If responses to this item are systematically related to the vote (i.e., if Republicans who favored the act voted Democratic and if Democrats who opposed it voted Republican), it is probably because the voters knew the differing Republican and Democratic positions on collective bargaining. An item such as this, then, has a substantial cognitive component. If an issue is salient enough that people become familiar with the parties' stands, then the issue position probably influenced their voting choices rather than vice versa.

In the 1968 data I presented, only one item is cast in such a way as to be vulnerable to a rationalization response set. It is the one which asks people, "In general, how do you feel about how President Johnson has done his job." The remainder of the items give away no clues of the positions of candidates or parties. But what of Key's data in *The Responsible Electorate*? In Chapter 3 Key outlines the class and issue bases of the emerging New Deal Democratic major-

ity. In the main his evidence depends on items that had a clear cognitive content. This portion of his argument stands up well on reexamination. Unfortunately, this is not as true of the later chapters on elections of the 1950s and 1960s. Here, many more of his items are of a form in which affect toward the parties or the candidates is a central component, e.g., "Which presidential candidate—Stevenson or Eisenhower—do you think could handle the Korean situation best?"³ Much of this evidence is suspect because of its possible contamination by rationalization.

The Normal Vote and Party Realignment

Brody and Page sound a second warning against normal-vote analysis. They point out that the technique considers issues "one by one in isolation from each other [so] . . . that the approach is continually reapportioning the same observed variation in the vote." Yet, in a sense this is one of its advantages. At a glance, one can see the degree to which voters who share a common position on a selected issue also support the same party and candidate. Differences in the expected party vote between groups with different opinions reveal the degree of ideological coherence of the parties on the issue at that point in time. If one then examines changes in the partisan components of an issue across a series of elections, one can show, as Pomper recently has, the pace at which the electorate has moved toward ideological clarity in its party attachments over time.⁴

In addition, the deviations of the observed vote from the expected vote point to the issues that appear important in changes in these party alignments. That is, in one election an issue may emerge which is associated with deviations from the expected party vote. By the next election enough people may have either changed their opinions or changed their party identification so that the issue cleavage is now manifest in a new party cleavage. This seems to have been the case with civil rights attitudes in the United States from 1956 to 1968.⁵ Normal vote analysis can therefore clearly demarcate the issues that underlie party realignments.

Brody and Page recommend loss-function models as an alternative to the normal vote. I conclude by posing one question of the most recent variants of loss-function equations pro-

² Key, p. 78.

⁴ Gerald M. Pomper, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System? What, Again?" *Journal of Politics*, 33 (Nov., 1971), pp. 916-40.

⁵ Pomper, pp. 925-26.

³ V. O. Key, Jr., *The Responsible Electorate* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 47.

posed by Brody and Page and by Shapiro.⁶ These models, particularly Shapiro's, permit each voter substantial latitude in selecting the criteria on which he evaluates the candidates. They also allow each voter to make his own determination of the salience of these criteria and permit voters to misperceive the candidates' stands on issues. Undoubtedly, these equations should predict the votes of each individual with accuracy, but accuracy is not the only criterion for the evaluation of a theory. The cost of this increased accuracy of predicting individual votes may be that we cannot apply these theories to normative democratic theory or to analytical theories of party competition and elec-

⁶ Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "The Assessment of Policy Voting: A Commentary," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 450-458, and Michael J. Shapiro, "Rational Political Man: A Synthesis of Economic and Social-Psychological Perspectives," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December, 1969), 1106-19.

toral change. For example, what can we say about democratic control of policy through elections, if our theories of the individual vote decision do not presume substantial agreement on the criteria by which people evaluate candidates. Similarly, what interesting propositions about party competition and electoral change can we generate if we cannot assume that people know with reasonable accuracy the policy positions of the parties.⁷ Unless the theories of the psychology of the vote decision are cast so that they can be integrated into broader theories of democratic control and party competition, then we may have solved less important problems at the expense of more critical ones.

⁷ This undoubtedly is why Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook assumed that "all citizens make identical estimates" of candidates' stands on issues. Otto A. Davis, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, "An Expository Development of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process," *American Political Science Review* 64 (June, 1970), 431.